Extension of the Unseaworthiness Remedy to Longshoremen--Triumph of Doctrine over Statutes by Bayer, Eugene Sidney
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 4
1964
Extension of the Unseaworthiness Remedy to
Longshoremen--Triumph of Doctrine over Statutes
Eugene Sidney Bayer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Eugene Sidney Bayer, Extension of the Unseaworthiness Remedy to Longshoremen--Triumph of Doctrine over Statutes, 15 W. Res. L. Rev.
753 (1964)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol15/iss4/8
Extension of Unseaworthiness Remedy
service and commuter traffic; and even if it lasted for only thirty days,
it would result in the layoff of some 6,000,000 non-railroad workers in
addition to the 700,000 idled railroad employees. The combined effect,
he said, would create a 15 per cent rise in unemployment, and cause a
drastic dedine in our production and competitive position in foreign and
domestic markets. Hence, in cases such as a potential rail strike, the na-
tional interest in maintenance of operations is dear. Although the na-
tional significance is not as great, the effect of a business shutdown in
individual communities may also have the same effect insofar as the
residents of those communities are concerned.
The thrust of this note has not been to show that voluntary arbitra-
tion is a proper substitute for free collective bargaining, but to indicate
that it may be the alternative to a work stoppage on both a national
and local scale. Voluntary arbitration is what Dr. George Taylor has
called the "least worst" solution to industrial strife. The risks involved
in its use are substantially reduced by the fact that it is a voluntary pro-
cedure which the parties can shape to be responsive to their own particu-
lar problems and values. After mediation and conciliation fail, voluntary
arbitration offers at least a last resort to the prevention of work stoppages.
In this respect, it is preferable to the government's playing a larger role in
determining the substantive aspects of labor contracts through the insti-
tution of compulsory bargaining.
ALAN V. FmEDMAN
Extension of the Unseaworthiness Remedy
to Longshoremen -Triumph of Doctrine
Over Statute
INTRODUCTION
Every court should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon the
rights of seamen, because they are unprotected and need counsel. ...
They are emphatically the wards of admiralty.'
This paternalistic expression of Justice Storey established a principle
under which federal courts have extended the protection available to
maritime workers. Admiralty courts have enlarged the scope as well
as the amount of awards granted to seamen and longshoremen who have
been injured in the course of their employment. This concern for the
1. Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823). Justice Storey's
devotion to the principle that seamen are entitled to special consideration was further ex-
pressed in his statement that "I am not bold enough to desert the steady light of maritime
jurisprudence for the more doubtful light of general reasoning." Id. at 485.
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welfare of maritime workers parallels the social philosophy underlying
workmen's compensation legislation. The philosophy is that the burden
of industrial injuries is properly shouldered by employers, for they are
in a position to shift the cost of such injuries to the consuming public
by the use of insurance and price adjustments.'
The traditional (now absolute) obligation of a shipowner to furnish
a seaworthy ship to seamen has been extended to benefit longshoremen
and harbor workers who are in the ship's service. Today, injured long-
shoremen have three remedies: a right to compensation under the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers Act,3 a cause of action based on the
unseaworthiness doctrine, and a common law action for negligence.
The purpose of this note is to outline the development of the unsea-
worthiness doctrine and extension of its protection to longshoremen.
This extension has been imposed in fact situations where it seemed to
some observers to be in direct conflict with express provisions of
the Longshoremen's Act. In such cases the Supreme Court has resolved
the conflict in favor of the longshoremen. In so doing, the Court has
declared that the humanitarian doctrine which attaches liability on a
vessel and its owner for anything less than a seaworthy ship, is superior
to the literal phraseology of the act.
An interpretative problem has also been presented when the "exclu-
siveness of employer liability" provisions of the Longshoremen's Act
have collided with the doctrine of unseaworthiness.4 Stevedore-em-
ployers5 have contended that the act limits their liability to compensation
payments, but the Court has been unreceptive to such a position which
would operate to minimize the protection afforded by the unseaworthiness
doctrine and other admiralty remedies available to injured longshore-
men.6 The resultant judicial construction of the act has been attacked
as a "severe shock"' and "a studied effort to circumvent the unequivocal
language.., of Congress. '
2. See PRossER, ToRTS 317 (2d ed. 1955).
3. 44 Stat. 1426, 33 U.S.C. §§ 903-950 (1957), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 906-941 (Supp.
III, 1962) [hereinafter cited as Longshoremen's Act].
4. Two important cases in which the collision has led to the Court's overriding the literal
phraseology of the Longshoremen's Act are cited in notes 86, 105 infra and accompanying texts.
5. The term "stevedore" will be used in this discussion to describe those who employ long-
shoremen.
6. See, e.g., Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953), where the Court said that the Long-
shoremen's Act "must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, and in a way
which avoids harsh and incongruous results." Also, in Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410,
414 (1963) the Court stated that "we cannot now consider the wording of the statute alone.
We must view it in the light of our prior cases in this area" as a prelude to rejecting "blind
adherence to the superficial meaning of a statute...."
7. Shields & Byrne, Application of the Unseaworthiness Doctrine of Longshoremen, 111
U. PA. L. REv. 1137 (1963).
8. Bue, The Enigma of Reed v. The S.S. Yaka, 1 HOUSTON L REV. 97, 113 (1963).
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The conflict between the unseaworthiness doctrine and the provisions
of the Longshoremen's Act is a classic example of collision between
doctrine and statute. This note will present a discussion of the conflict
and its resolution in favor of the doctrine in the hope of aiding parties
in future disputes in achieving "reckonability of result."9  Attention
will be directed to "what was bothering and what was helping the court
as it decided"'" that the Longshoremen's Act is legislation which increases
the relief available to longshoremen rather than providing a device
whereby employers can deny liability arising from an unseaworthy
ship. The Court has announced that neither contractual schemes between
shipowners and stevedores, nor technical applications of the "exclusive"
provisions of the Longshoremen's Act, can deprive longshoremen of the
full benefit of the unseaworthiness doctrine.
THE UNSEAWORTHINESS DOCTRINE
Historical Development
In addition to a common law action for negligence, longshoremen
have only those rights which have been created by statute or extended
to them by judicial decision. Seamen," on the other hand, have long
had three common law actions, i.e., negligence, Maintenance and cure, 2
and unseaworthiness." Specific legislation has enlarged one of the reme-
dies.'" Because of developments in the law of admiralty during the
twentieth century, however, the claim of unseaworthiness has become
the principal device for recovery in personal injury actions for both
seamen and longshoremen."
The duty of a shipowner to furnish seamen a seaworthy ship, in
addition to his liability for maintenance and cure, was first mentioned
in the Cyrus'6 case. Later, in the Osceola'" case, the Court added dicta
9. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 177 (1960).
10. Ibid.
11. The term "seamen" will be used in this note to describe those who serve a ship under
articles.
12. These include medical costs, living expenses, and lost wages of sick or injured seamen
whose injuries or illness occur during the time they are under shipping articles. GILMORE &
BLACK, ADMIRALTY 253-71 (1957).
13. "Unseaworthiness" has been defined as a condition of a vessel arising from failure to
furnish a ship, including its gear, appurtenances, and manning so as to be reasonably fit for
its intended purpose. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 27, at 63 (1959), citing
Amador v. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, 224 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1955).
14. In 1920, before the unseaworthiness doctrine had been fully developed, Congress enacted
the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 688 (1958), which gave seamen the right to
institute actions against negligent employers and abolished the defense of contributory negli-
gence.
15. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 315 (1957).
16. 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789). A detailed description of the growth of
the unseaworthiness doctrine is found in Justice Stewart's opinion in Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960). After indicating that ancient codifications of the law of
19641
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
that failure to satisfy this duty gives rise to a claim for damages. Justice
Brown's opinion declared that the law was "settled" as to the liability
of vessel and owner. Both English and American law, he continued,
consider the vessel and its owner liable for injuries suffered by seamen
in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or for failure to supply
and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.'"
While the Osceola case imposed liability on a shipowner for unsea-
worthiness, it protected him if injury to a seaman resulted from the neg-
ligence of another member of the crew. This holding was merely a re-
statement of the fellow servant rule" which, until the passage of the Jones
Act, barred most negligence actions.
The Jones Act granted "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury
in the course of his employment" the right to maintain an action at law
for damages regardless of whether the negligence was that of the owner,
master, or a fellow crew member. For a quarter of a century, actions for
negligence under the Jones Act displaced the remedy afforded by the un-
seaworthiness doctrine.2"
In Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.,2 the unseaworthiness doctrine
emerged to dispel any uncertainty as to the absolute duty imposed on
shipowners to furnish a seaworthy ship. The plaintiff in Mahnich,
whose injury was caused by a fall from a collapsed staging which had
the sea (reprinted in 30 Fed. Cas. 1171-1216) contained no reference to such a doctrine,
Justice Stewart conceded that the earliest American cases involved wages claimed by seamen
who had justifiably deserted an unseaworthy ship. See, e.g., The Cyrus, supra; The Moslem,
17 Fed. Cas. 894 (No. 9875) (S.D.N.Y. 1946). Justice Stewart traced the development of
case law to The Osceola through a series of decisions in the late nineteenth century which
treated cases of maritime injury "on the same footing as cases involving the duty of a shoreside
employer to exercise ordinary care to provide his employees with a reasonably safe place to
work." Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc. supra at 544.
The modern development of the unseaworthiness doctrine stems from the opinion in
Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922) wherein it was stated:
We think the trial court might have told the jury that without regard to neg-
ligence the vessel was unseaworthy when she left the dock if the can marked "coal
oil" contained gasolene; also that she was unseaworthy if no life preservers were on
board; and if thus unseaworthy and one of the crew received damage as the direct
result thereof, he was entitled to recover compensatory damages. Id. at 259. (Em-
phasis added.)
The historical discussion ended with the designation of Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321
U.S. 96 (1944) as "a landmark in the development of admiralty law" which placed "an
unqualified stamp of solid authority to the view .. .that the duty to provide a seaworthy
ship depends not at all upon the negligence of the shipowner or his agents." 362 U.S. 539,
548 (1960).
17. 189 U.S. 158 (1903). The Osceola case is the source of the classical statement that
a ship and its owner are liable, regardless of fault, to seamen for maintenance and cure
during illness or injury and for indemnity for injuries incurred as a result of the unseaworthy
condition of the ship.
18. Id. at 175.
19. Under the fellow servant rule, an employer is not liable for injuries caused solely by the
negligence of a fellow servant.
20. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 316 (1957).
21. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
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resulted from the parting of a defective rope, failed to bring his suit within
the limitation period prescribed by the Jones Act. Thus, since a negligence
complaint under the Jones Act was not available to the plaintiff, the
Supreme Court took the opportunity to restate, in absolute terms, the
obligation of a shipowner to furnish a seaworthy ship. The great develop-
ment and extension of the unseaworthiness doctrine which followed the
Mahnich case was based on the following language of Chief Justice Stone.
We have often had occasion to emphasize the conditions of the sea-
man's employment... which have been deemed to make him a ward
of the admiralty and to place large responsibility for his safety on the
owner. He is subject to the rigorous discipline of the sea, and all the
conditions of his service constrain him to accept, without critical ex-
amination and without protest, working conditions and appliances as
commanded by his superior officers. These conditions, which have gen-
erated the exacting requirement that the vessel or the owner must
provide the seaman with seaworthy appliances with which to do his
work, likewise require that safe appliances be furnished when and where
the work is to be done.22
Two years later in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,2" the same doctrine
was extended to longshoremen and others "within the range of its hu-
manitarian policy." This extension led to large personal injury awards
the payment of which often fell upon stevedores as a result of their con-
tractual duty to indemnify the shipowner. The disputes engendered by
such results center around the exclusive liability provisions of the Long-
shoremen's Act. Since the disputed cases involve circumstances in which
both the act and the unseaworthiness doctrine are substantial factors, it
is necessary to review the scope and nature of both in terms of their inter-
relation.
Scope of the Unseaworthiness Doctrine
Unseaworthiness can be caused by a defect or inadequacy in the ship,
its appliances, or its machinery.24 Defective appliances brought on board
by an independent contractor have also sustained the claim, " as has an
assault by an unusually violent crew member. "
22. Id. at 103-04.
23. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
24. See, e.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Halecki v. United N.Y. &
N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 251 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1958).
25. The nondelegable nature of a shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship was
demonstrated in Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 396 (1954). In Petterson, the longshoreman's injury was caused by a snatch
block which, according to the evidence, was probably brought aboard by the stevedore. In
spite of the fact that the shipowner was never connected with the snatch block, he was held
liable to the worker.
26. In Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955), the plaintiff-seaman was asleep
in his bunk when Gonzales, an inebriated crew member, came into the room to steal a bottle
of brandy. The plaintiff awakened only to be severely beaten by Gonzales. Eight members
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The essence of the seaworthiness doctrine was recently summarized
in Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp.7 as "things about a ship, whether
the hull, the decks, the machinery, the tools furnished, the stowage, or
the cargo containers, must be reasonably fit for the purpose for which
they are to be used.
28
The Gutierrez case also states that unseaworthiness can have an effect on
land as well as aboard ship. Citing the Extension of Admiralty Juris-
diction Act,29 the Court stated that "there is no distinction in admiralty
between torts committed by the ship itself and by the ship's personnel
while operating it, any more than there is between torts 'committed'
by a corporation and by its employees."3
The duty to furnish a seaworthy ship is essentially a liability without
fault, imposed on a humanitarian basis to protect seamen. Since the
Mahnich case it is clear that the duty is independent of negligence - it
is imposed by law and is absolute.
Absolute and Nondelegable Duty
The absolute duty of a shipowner to furnish a seaworthy ship as
expressed in the Sieracki and Mahnich cases is nondelegable.3" This
concept is found in other areas of the law. For example, when injuries
result from the use of purchased commodities, strict liability has
been imposed on the manufacturer in many cases on the theory of implied
warranty of merchantibility. 2  In the past, however, in order to recover
on the theory of implied warranty, the plaintiff had to show privity of
contract.3" The law then took a forward step by extending liability in
of the Supreme Court allowed recovery from the owner on the basis of unseaworthiness which
they said was caused by Gonzales' presence aboard the ship. The Court explained:
A seaman with a proclivity for assaulting people may, indeed, be a more deadly risk
than a rope with a weak strand or a hull with a latent defect. The problem, as with
many aspects of the law, is one of degree.... A vessel bursting at the seams might
be a safer place than one with a homicidal maniac as a crew member. Id. at
339-40.
27. 373 U.S. 206 (1964).
28. Id. at 213.
29. 62 Star. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1959).
30. 373 U.S. 206, 210 (1964). Justice Stewart carried the analogy landward in Kermarec
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959), by describing the obligation
of a shipowner as akin to that of owners and occupiers of land. In awarding damages to a
visitor who fell on a defective stairway he said: "We hold that the owner of a ship in naviga-
ble waters owes to all who are on board for purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests
the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case." Id. at 632. (Em-
phasis added.)
31. See, e.g., Thorson v. Inland Nav. Co., 270 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1959); Crawford v.
Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1953).
32. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
33. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943).
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favor of those who could not plead privity." A major study of the law
of torts summarizes this proposition as follows:
Warranties may be imposed or annexed to a transaction by law, because
one party to a transaction is in a better position than another (1) "to
know the antecedents of a thing.. ." dealt with; (2) to control those
antecedents; (3) and to distribute losses which occur because the thing
has a dangerous quality; (4) when that danger is not ordinarily to be
expected; (5) so that other parties will be likely to assume its absence
and therefore refrain from taking self-protective care.35
Absence of fault has been rejected as a bar to liability where the
public welfare requires imposition of liability. Legal writers have also
recognized a need to impose liability without fault.3 6 This doctrine is
now found in codified law.3"
The absolute liability which the law of admiralty imposes on ship-
owners for unseaworthiness is similar to that imposed on manufacturers
of goods. In fact, an authority in the field of .products liability cites
the Sieracki decision as an example of the extension of strict liability.38
The decisions in both areas favor those whose injuries have been caused by
factors which the manufacturer or shipowner should have controlled. Even
when component parts obtained from third parties are the cause of the
injury, liability is imposed on the basis of implied warranty. 9
The nondelegable nature of such duties is best described in the Re-
statement of Torts.
One who employs an independent contractor to do work, which the
employer should recognize as necessarily requiring the creation during
its progress of a condition involving a peculiar risk of bodily harm to
others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise
reasonable care to take such precautions."
The hazardous conditions existing in the maritime industry and the duty of a
shipowner to furnish a seaworthy ship have demanded that this duty
become absolute and nondelegable.
34. See, e.g., McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Ket-
terer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
35. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1516 (1956).
36. See, e.g., 4 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 507 (1959), in which the author states: "It had
to be recognized that the social interest in the general security had to be looked to as the basis
of the legal theory of liability rather than the interest in the general morals." See also HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAw 140 (1881), wherein Justice Holmes states that "imposition of an un-
reasonable risk of injury upon others resulting in harm to them was legally blameworthy
even if no moral element was involved."
37. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
38. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10.1 (1961).
39. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
40. REsTATEENT, TORTS § 416 (1934).
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UNSEAWORTHINESS AND LONGSHOREMEN
Two years after the Mahnich decision, a longshoreman was injured
during a loading operation by a defective boom on a ship. His action
against the shipowner, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,4" was brought before
the Supreme Court to determine whether "the obligation of seaworthiness,
traditionally owed by an owner of a ship to seamen, extends to a stevedore
injured while working aboard the ship. '42  Justice Rutledge, writing for
the majority, described the basis for holding ships and their owners liable
to longshoremen.
It is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous to other
well known instances in our law. Derived from and shaped to meet
the hazards which performing the service imposes, the liability is neither
limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character ....
It is a form of absolute duty owing to all within the range of its hu-
manitarian policy.43
The broad language of this decision extended protection not only to
longshoremen, but to all workers who are exposed to shipboard hazards
by reason of their employment. 4  It appears that the right of longshore-
men and others to recover for unseaworthiness arises from the owner's
consent rather than from the contract of employment.
Does History Support the Sieracki Decision?
Chief Justice Stone, writing the dissent in Sieracki, stated that there
was no precedent or warrant in history to support the majority's position.
Some writers soon echoed this opinion, stating that "the courts have
either misread, or have not read, the facts of history."4  One authority
accused the Supreme Court of "making harbor workers amphibious."46
These criticisms may be summarized as follows: (1) there is no precedent
for the extension of the unseaworthiness doctrine to longshoremen; (2)
the Supreme Court is accomplishing by "judicial legislation" what has
not previously existed in law or history; and (3) the Court was not
justified in creating a new right for land-based workers.
The generic classification of longshoremen with seamen is not new
to the law. While nineteenth century admiralty decisions disclose a
division of opinion, opinions are found which belie the charge that
history has been misread by the Court. One jurist wrote that "formerly,
the labor of unloading was usually performed by seamen . . . ,,, and a
41. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
42. Id. at 87.
43. Id. at 94-95.
44. Id. at 91.
45. Shields & Byrne, supra note 7, at 1152.
46. GILMORE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 359 (1957).
47. Florez v. The Scotia, 35 Fed. 916 (S.D. N.Y. 1888).
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contemporary court stated that "these . . . [longshoremen] are mere
substitutes for seamen....
The rationale that longshoremen perform a maritime service formerly
rendered by the ship's crew was the basis for a unanimous decision as
long ago as 1913 which held that a longshoreman could sue in admiralty
after he was injured aboard ship.4" Justice Hughes said:
We entertain no doubt that the service in loading and stowing a ship's
cargo is of this [maritime] character. Upon its proper performance
depend in large measure the safe carrying of the cargo and the safety
of the ship itself; and it is a service absolutely necessary to enable the
ship to discharge its maritime duty. Formerly the work was done by
the ship's crew; but, owing to the exigencies of increasing commerce
and the demand for rapidity and special skill, it has become a special-
ized service devolving upon a class "as dearly identified with maritime
affairs as are the mariners." 50
Twelve years later, Justice Holmes spoke for another unanimous
Court which held that there was an identity of rights between seamen
and longshoremen. In International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,5' the
Court held that a longshoreman was entitled to sue his employer under the
Jones Act for negligence which resulted in injury. Although that act had
given a cause of action to seamen, Justice Holmes again held that since
longshoremen are engaged in the same maritime service, they are entitled
to the same type of protection. The opinion is of current significance,
for it is a guide to the "collision" between doctrine and statute which ap-
peared in later decisions. On this matter, Justice Holmes stated:
We cannot believe that Congress willingly would have allowed the
protection to men engaged upon the same maritime duties to vary
with the accident of their being employed by a stevedore rather than
by the ship.52
A definitive treatise on maritime injuries53 defends the Court's reason-
ing in spite of the author's reluctance to approve the extension of the unsea-
worthiness claim to longshoremen.5 4  After consultation with veteran
masters, engineers, and deck officers, Norris concluded that during the
early years of steam navigation much of the maintenance and stevedore
48. The Seguranca, 58 Fed. 908, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
49. Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
50. Id. at 61-62.
51. 272 U.S. 50 (1926). Justice Holmes saw no reason to differentiate between seamen
and longshoremen in view of the historical fact that the work of longshoremen is a maritime
service formerly performed by the crew. This was also the conclusion of the Court in Sieracki
twenty years later.
52. Id. at 52.
53. NoRRis, MARmIME INJuRIES (1959).
54. Id. at § 15.
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work was indeed performed by crews." This well-supported conclusion
lends credence to the argument that history supports the Court.
After longshoremen were guaranteed a seaworthy ship in Sieracki,
the Court extended the protection to a carpenter in Pope & Talbot, Inc.
v. Hawn,5" stating:
His need for protection from unseaworthiness was neither more nor
less than that of the stevedores then working with him on the ship
or of seamen who had been or were about to go on a voyage. All
were subjected to the same danger. All were entitled to like treatment
under law.57
It is no longer speculative whether longshoremen and other land
workers have a remedy for unseaworthiness - it is a settled matter
of law. Employment by shipowner or stevedore is not the ratio decidendi
- the performance of a function essential to maritime service is the
decisive factor.
Was the Extension "Judicial Legislation?"
"The favorite way of criticizing the Supreme Court is to say it is
another example of judicial legislation."58  One critic describes a recent
admiralty decision of the Court "as one of the most vivid examples of
judicial legislation to emanate from that body in recent years ... ""
Such a charge is to be expected from observers who do not agree with
the philosophy of judicial activism, especially when they do not agree
with the result in a specific case.
On the other hand, Justice Holmes has said that "in substance the
growth of the law is legislative."00 Considerations of what is expedient
for the community are as important, he said, as syllogistic manipulation
of precedent.61 Professor Leon Green adds that "it is no longer venture-
some to assume that the judgment of courts. .. are only to be understood
in the light of the results which the judges thought the social order of
the times required."" This is especially true in admiralty. Justice
55. Id. at § 48A. Norris lists the present-day division of labor which corresponds to tasks
formerly performed by the crew. The list includes longshoremen, shipcleaners, port watch-
men, tank cleaners, painters, riggers, carpenters, ship ceilers, checkers and tallyers, marine
equipment specialists, plumbers, electricians, repairmen, and pipe fitters. But see Pilot's
Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959), where a harbor worker who was injured by inhaling
carbon tetrachloride while cleaning electrical equipment was held not entitled to the war-
ranty of unseaworthiness "because his work was not traditionally performed by seamen."
56. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
57. Id. at 413.
58. Keeton, Proceedings of Thursday, April 9, 1959, 4 So. TEx. L.J. 120, 124 (1959).
59. Bue, op. cit. supra note 8, at 97.
60. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881).
61. Ibid.
62. GREEN, JUDGE & JURY 103 (1930).
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Frankfurter reinforced this point, stating that "no area of federal law
is judge-made at its source to such an extent as is the law of admiralty."'6 3
Those who have studied the trend conclude that the principle of strict
liability is being extended by both statute and common-law develop-
ment. 4 The extension of the unseaworthiness doctrine to longshoremen,
however, represents a specific societal attitude that the burden of indus-
trial accidents should fall first on those who have the capacity to shift
the cost to the general public. Since all states have workmen's com-
pensation acts embodying that philosophy,"3 it cannot be doubted that
the Court is properly expressing American social policy in its disposition
of cases involving maritime personal injuries.
THE LONGSHOREMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT6 6
Today there is no question about the statement that "longshoremen,
engaged in the service of a ship are entitled to the same protection
against unseaworthiness which members of the ship's crew would enjoy.) 67
Half a century ago, this remedy would not have been available to long-
shoremen. The fellow-servant rule defeated recovery in many cases,
and it will be remembered that maintenance and cure was never available
to longshoremen."
Growing concern for industrial accidents led to enactment of state
workmen's compensation laws. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,69 however,
such statutes were held inapplicable to longshoremen performing mari-
time services. The constitutional mandate7' that all matters of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction are federal questions was invoked by the Court
to strike down successive efforts by Congress to authorize state coverage
of longshoremen.71  The Court advised Congress that only it had the
power to legislate in the areas of maritime and admiralty jurisdiction.72 Con-
gress took the indicated path, and in 1927 enacted the Longshoremen's Act.
63. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
64. PROSSER, TORTs 344 (2d ed. 1955).
65. 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 5.30 (1952).
66. 44 Star. 1426, 33 U.S.C. §§ 903-950 (1957), as amended, 33 U.S.C. 906-941 (Supp.
III, 1962).
67. Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657, 659 (3d Cit. 1964).
68. NORRIS, op. cit. supra note 53, at § 13.
69. 242 U.S. 205 (1917). In the Jensen case, a land based worker died as a result of an
injury incurred while working on board a vessel. The attempt of his heirs to recover com-
pensation under the state compensation act was denied by the Court on the basis that the right
to recover for such injury and death on navigable waters was created by admiralty and cog-
nizable only by such law. In denying state compensation the Court concluded that uni-
formity in admiralty is of the essence.
70. U.S. Const., art. III, § 2.
71. Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
72. Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., supra note 71, at 227.
1964]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
General Provisions of the Act
The Longshoremen's Act is modeled after the New York work-
men's compensation statute.7" It contains the usual quid pro quo found
in all compensation acts, i.e., the employer is bound to pay set sums to
workers who are injured in the course of their employment, and the
workers in turn are denied the right to seek large awards through negli-
gence actions. The liability placed on the employer is absolute and
cannot be avoided by the defense of contributory negligence or assumption
of the risk.74 The act is the employee's exclusive remedy75 against his
employer. The exclusion applies to the employee's legal representatives,
spouse, parents, dependents, next of kin, or anyone else entitled to recovery
from the employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or
death.7"
Shipmasters and crew members are not covered by the Longshore-
men's Act77 since they have either an action under the unseaworthiness
doctrine, the Jones Act, or an action for maintenance and cure. Also
excepted are those engaged in work or repair of small vessels (defined as
those under eighteen tons net), and any officer or employee of state, fed-
eral, or foreign governments. 8
Four presumptions" are set forth in the Longshoremen's Act, all of
which tend to encourage its liberal purpose of granting awards. These
presumptions are (1) validity of claims, (2) adequate notice, (3)
sobriety, and (4) absence of willful injury on the part of the employee.
Furthermore, the burden of rebutting these presumptions is on the em-
ployer. Thus, it can be seen that Congress was quite explicit in ensuring
that awards would not be easily denied.
Third Party Tortfeasor Provisions
A major area of dispute has evolved from the act's preservation of
a cause of action against a tortfeasor who is not part of the compensation
system."0 The underlying social policy is that where a stranger causes
an injury (either by overt act or breach of a nondelegable duty) the
compensation law should not bar attempts to recover from him.8' Con-
gressional draftsmen foresaw these situations involving third party tort-
feasors. Hence, procedures are outlined for assignment to the employer
73. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 65, at 89.10.
74. NORRIS, op. cit. supra note 53, at § 132.
75. 33 U.S.C. §905 (1959).
76. Ibid.
77. 33 U.S.C. §903(1) (1959).
78. Ibid.
79. 33 U.S.C. §920 (1959).
80. 33 U.S.C. §933 (1959).
81. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 65, at § 71.10.
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of the right to proceed against third parties in connection with an injury
for which an award has been made.82 Also, if the employee chooses
to proceed against the stranger in an action at law instead of accepting
an award, the employer must still guarantee the amount of the unclaimed
award in the event that the judgment at law fails to equal the award
amount."3 Conversely, if the employer successfully proceeds in subro-
gation against the third party, he may retain only that amount which
will reimburse him for award payments already made or provided for,
in addition to legal expenses incurred in the suit.84
Judicial Construction of the Act - Literal or Liberal?
It is a well-established rule that remedial legislation should be
liberally construed.' Since the Longshoremen's Compensation Act pur-
ports to govern relations between longshoremen and their employers, the
question frequently arises as to its position in admiralty law in general.
This problem has been particularly vexatious when the literal words of
the act have been in apparent conflict with results in specific cases.
Czaplicki v. The S.S. Hoegh Silvercloud,8" for example, was the first
instance in which the Supreme Court found it necessary to ignore the literal
words of the act. There, the plaintiff-longshoreman was injured when
wooden steps gave way. The cause of the failure was traced to the manu-
facturer, but an award was made under the act. The right of recovery was
assigned by law to the stevedore-employer who could have recovered dam-
ages in excess of the award. But, the employer failed to proceed against the
manufacturer and the longshoreman libeled the vessel for unseaworthi-
ness. The libel was attacked as being without right, for under the act
the employer had become the proper libelant. Ironically, the same in-
surance company carried the liability coverage for both the plaintiff's
employer and the manufacturer of the stairs. Recovery for negligent con-
struction which exceeded the compensation award would go to the em-
ployee,87 but the same insurance company would pay both amounts. The
identity of interest had created a stalemate.
Justice Harlan, speaking for a unanimous Court, said that the literal
words of the act meant that the plaintiff's right to further recovery was
in the hands of the party most likely to suffer were that right to be
enforced.
[G]iven the conflict of interests and inaction by the assignee, the em-
82. 33 U.S.C. §933(c) (1959).
83. 33 U.S.C. §933(f) (1959).
84. 33 U.S.C. § 933(e) (1959).
85. See, e.g., Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953).
86. 351 U.S. 525 (1956).
87. 33 U.S.C. §933(e) (1959).
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ployee should not be relegated to any rights he may have against the
assignee, but can maintain the third-party action himseff.88
The longshoreman was allowed to bring the action in his own name.
The Court held that under such circumstances, the literal wording of the
statute must be ignored in order to achieve a proper result.8 9
Although the situation in the Czaplicki case is rarely encountered, the
Court has solved similar cases by merely ignoring the literal words of the
act.
THE INDEMNITY DISPUTE
The provisions of the Longshoremen's Act which preserved actions
against third party tortfeasors ° made certain that either the longshore-
man or the stevedore could seek recovery against the shipowner when-
ever unseaworthiness was a factor in the injury. In addition, it will be
remembered that the shipowner has been held to an absolute duty to
furnish a seaworthy ship even in cases where the stevedore or his em-
ployee have caused the unseaworthiness.9 '
The Court found it necessary to consider relief for shipowners who
were forced to pay judgments for injuries caused by unseaworthiness in
spite of the fact that they were innocent of wrongdoing. This was
doubly unfair where the stevedore had caused the unseaworthiness but
was protected from further judgment by the exclusive provisions of the
Longshoremen's Act. 2 The rationale was found in a similar experience
under state compensation acts which provide that
if the employer can be said to have breached an independent duty to-
ward the third party, or if there is a basis for finding an implied
promise of indemnity, recovery in the form of indemnity may be al-
lowed.93
Such indemnity was first enforced in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
S.S. Corp.,94 where the injured longshoreman accepted voluntary compen-
sation payments from his employer, then instituted an action against the
shipowner. The stevedore was impleaded and held liable to indemnify
the shipowner. The stevedore contended that the Longshoremen's Act
insulated him from liability for injury to his employees after compensa-
88. 352 U.S. 525, 532 (1956).
89. Id. at 531. Amendments to §933 of the Longshoremen's Act made in 1959 give long-
shoremen six months after an award has been made in which to proceed independently
against the third party torrfeasor. This provision alleviates situations such as that found in the
Czaplicki case where an employer "sits" on the claim. There is no longer a complete assign-
ment of the claim to the employer at the time of an award.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 933(a), (b), (c) (1959).
91. Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cit. 1953), aff'd per curiam 374 U.S.
396 (1954).
92. 33 U.S.C. §905 (1959).
93. 2 LARSEN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 76.00 (1952).
94. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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tion had been paid. The Court stated, however, that "the act prescribed
no quid pro quo for a shipowner that is compelled to pay a judgment
against it for the full amount of a longshoreman's damages.""
The argument of the stevedore was very persuasive in that the facts
in the Ryan case did not present a clear case requiring a negligent contrac-
tor to bear the ultimate loss of the longshoreman's injury for there was no
evidence that the'stevedore was negligent. In reviewing the case , the
Supreme Court decided two issues: (1) whether the Longshoremen's Act
precludes a shipowner from asserting that a stevedore is liable to indem-
nify him for damages paid to an injured longshoreman who happens to be
employed by the stevedore; and (2) whether there is, absent an express
agreement, any liability of the stevedore for damages to workmen
caused by improper performance of the stevedoring contract. The
Court answered both questions in the negative. First, the Court declared
that the Longshoremen's Act does stand as a bar to further liability on
the part of the stevedore to longshoremen after awards are determined
under the act. Second, the provisions in the act which allow actions
against third parties specifically allow a longshoreman to proceed against
a shipowner. Furthermore, it is equally permissible for a shipowner to
raise any claim it has against a stevedore which arises from a breach of
contract or warranty.
9 6
With respect to breach of warranty, the Court held that the
action was based on the implied contractual obligation of the stevedore
to the shipowner to perform the stevedoring contract in a proper manner.
In this respect, the warranty is akin to a manufacturer's warranty that a
product is sound.97 The Ryan case, therefore, set forth the rela-
tions between shipowner and stevedore in terms of contract, rather than
tort. A stevedore is liable to shipowners if his services are not performed
in a reasonable and safe manner. This is true even in cases where the
shipowner is himself negligent.98 The strength of the implied warranty
theory is great enough to impose liability even where the contractor is
not negligent.9 The indemnity may arise from an express contract,'
in which case the agreement has removed any bar to the intended result.
95. Id. at 128.
96. Id. at 130. See also RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 76 (1937), which states that
a person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him but
which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the other,
is entitled to indemnity from the other, unless the payor is barred by the wrongful
nature of his conduct.
97. 350 U.S. 124, 134 (1956).
98. See Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958), where the
shipowner was allowed idemnity from the stevedore although the original award to the long-
shoreman was based on the negligence of the owner!
99. Italia Sodeta per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 84 Sup. Ct. 748
(1964).
100. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
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Section five of the Longshoremen's Act represents a quid pro quo
between longshoremen and stevedores, but the doctrine of implied war-
ranty allows shipowners to recover from stevedores independent of the
act. The Court might have read the act in the Ryan case so as to ex-
onerate the stevedore. But the Court held Ryan Stevedoring Company
liable to the shipowner, Pan-Atlantic, not the longshoreman. Breach of
its implied warranty to the shipowner made Ryan responsible for the
unseaworthy ship, and thus it was ordered to indemnify Pan-Atlantic.
THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AcT COLLIDES WITH A LIEN
The Maritime Lien
The maritime lien is peculiar to admiralty. It is a long-accepted de-
vice whereby a party whose claim is based on a maritime contract or
tort achieves a possessory interest in the ship or cargo concerned.Y1 Liens
arise from the furnishing of supplies, seaman's wages, tortious conduct,
or a claim for freight." 2
Maritime liens may be enforced by a libel in rem, a concept virtually
unknown outside of the law of admiralty. The prosecution of such an
action consists of taking the vessel into the custody of the court (arrest)
until the owner appears as "claimant" to conduct a defense. If the owner
does not appear, or his defense fails, the vessel may be sold by the court to
satisfy the claim. The in rem action is superior to all other claims and
"good against the world.""'3 Justice Holmes summarized this procedure
as follows:
A collision takes place between two vessels, the Ticonderoga and the
Melampus, through the fault of the Ticonderoga alone. That ship is
under a lease at the time, the lessee has his own master in charge, and the
owner of the vessel has no manner of control over it. The owner,
therefore, is not to blame, and he cannot even be charged on the ground
that the damage was done by his servants. He is free from personal
liability on elementary principles. Yet it is perfectly settled that there
is a lien on his vessel for the amount of the damage done, and this
means that that vessel may be arrested and sold to pay the loss in any
admiralty court whose process will reach her.104
This language proved prophetic in Reed v. The Yaka,0 5 decided
eighty-two years later, in which the legal relations were almost identical
to those described in Justice Holmes' imaginary collision situation. In
the Yaka case, the defendant-stevedore contended that application of the
101. GILMORE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 31-32 (1957).
102. Ibid.
103. Id. at 33.
104. HOLMES, THE CoMMoN; LAw 27 (1881). This concept is usually cited from The
Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464 (1901), and it appears regularly in current opinions. See, e.g.,
Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
105. Supra note 104. The Yaka was indeed out of possession of its owner and "under
lease" to the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Co.
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long-established admiralty principle of libel for unseaworthiness was
foreclosed by the provisions of the Longshoremen's Act.' °6 The peti-
tioner's injury occurred when a wooden pallet on which he was standing
gave way due to a latent defect; his sudden outcry was misconstrued by
the winch operator as a signal to lower heavy cases of chocolate syrup there-
by trapping the longshoreman. The latent defect in the pallet was enough
to support a claim of unseaworthiness since it was basically the same as the
collapsed staging in Sieracki; and even if it had been brought aboard during
the loading operations by the stevedore, it would have been, according to
the Petterson '0 rationale, no less the responsibility of the shipowner. The
primary question before the Court involved the ownership of the ship. The
Waterman Steamship Corporation was the owner of record, but the Pan-
Atlantic Company, under a bareboat charter,' was the owner pro hac vice.
Pan-Atlantic, a stevedoring company for which the longshoreman was
working at the time of the accident, was also operating the S.S. Yaka
under a demise charter.0 9 When the case came to the courts, it was
necessary to untangle an employer liable only under the Longshoremen's
Act from an employer who was, for all legal purposes, the owner of a
ship and thus also liable for unseaworthiness. The Court concluded that
the injured longshoreman was more deserving than an employer who
chose to wear two hats."' More specifically, the trial court"' held:
(1) the latent defect in the pallet rendered the ship unseaworthy; (2) the
ship was subject to a libel in rem; (3) the shipowner, Waterman, was liable
for unseaworthiness; (4) Pan-Adantic was liable to the owner on the basis
of indemnity; and (5) the Longshoreman's Act was not a bar to the
action or to the indemnity. The Supreme Court eventually restored this
holding after a reversal in the court of appeals."2
The in rem liability of a ship was decisive in the Yaka case, for the
plaintiff's attorneys were required to counter the defendant's defense that
its liability as an employer was dearly limited in section five of the Long-
shoremen's Act. That section provides:
106. [T1he Court of Appeals held, and Pan-Atantic would have us hold, that petitioner
must be completely denied the traditional and basic protection of the warranty of seaworthi-
ness simply because Pan-Atlantic was not only the owner pro hac vice of the ship but was also
petitioner's employer. 373 U.S. 410, 418 (1963).
107. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
108. A bareboat charter is a contract under which the "Charterer" takes over an entire
ship and mans her with his own people. The owner relinquishes complete control for the
period covered by the "charter party," and the charterer becomes the owner pro hac vice (for
this turn).
109. Demise charter is synonymous with bareboat charter.
110. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
111. Reed v. The S.S. Yaka, 183 F. Supp. 69 (F-D. Pa. 1960).
112. Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 307 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1962).
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The liability of an employer ...shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative,
husband or wife, parent, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise
entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty
on account of such injury or death .... 113
As noted previously, Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp."4 was the first case to achieve the result of placing responsibility
on a stevedore in spite of section five of the Longshoremen's Act; how-
ever, this was limited to cases where it could be shown that a duty to
indemnify a shipowner existed. In the Yaka case, however, the Water-
man Steamship Company could be reached only through a libel in rem
which forced Waterman to appear as claimant after which Waterman
could seek indemnification from Pan-Atlantic. Pan-Atlantic was, by virtue
of the bareboat charter, the owner pro hac vice; but plaintiff's attorneys
might have risked dismissal had they sought to proceed against the em-
ployer since such a step is expressly forbidden by the Longshoremen's Act.
The strategy of Pan-Atlantic and Waterman was clear. A bareboat
charter could immunize a stevedore as employer from unseaworthy actions
as easily as it transferred ownership of the vessel pro hac vice to him.
Counsel for the plaintiff, however, devised what one critic has called
"a unique and ingenious theory.""' Recognizing the difficulty in naming
an employer who, as defendant, could plead section five of the Long-
shoremen's Act, counsel for the plaintiff libeled the ship in the best
tradition of admiralty. As previously described, a maritime lien and libel
in rem to enforce such a lien is based on the plaintiff's possessory interest
in the ship which it is expected that the owner will appear to contest.
The trial court approved this approach stating that "to hold otherwise
would be to invite contracted-for situations such as we have here, for
the sole purpose of destroying a longshoreman's in rem remedy which
the law of admiralty had traditionally recognized.""' 6 Justice Black, who
supported this position on appeal, stated:
In particular, we pointed out several times in the Sieracki case, which
has been consistently followed since, that a shipowner's obligation of
seaworthiness cannot be shifted about, limited, or escaped by con-
tracts and that the shipowner's obligation is rooted, not in contracts,
but in the hazards of the work. 117
In Yaka, the Supreme Court applied the established principles of ad-
miralty rather than the literal words of the Longshoremen's Act. To do
otherwise, Justice Black argued, would be to defeat the remedial purpose
113. 33 U.S.C. §905 (1959).
114. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
115. Bue, The Enigma of Reed v. The S.S. Yaka, I HOUsTON L. REv. 97, 104 (1963).
116. Reed v. The S.S. Yaka, 183 F. Supp. 69, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
117. 373 U.S. 410, 414 (1963).
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of the statute. He recalled that under the Ryan doctrine of indemnity,
a longshoreman whose employer was not also the owner pro hac vice
would experience no difficulty in prosecuting his unseaworthiness claim.
It would be out of keeping, he said,
to distinguish between liability to longshoremen injured under precisely
the same circumstances because some draw their pay directly from a
shipowner and others from a stevedoring company doing the ship's ser-
vice.118
As to the statute, Justice Black stated that "only blind adherence to the
superficial meaning of a statute" ' could defeat the action. The steve-
dore had voluntarily become the owner of a ship and thus assumed the
nondelegable duties which went with such status.
The circle of protection for longshoremen is now complete. The
right to a seaworthy ship is firmly rooted in admiralty law, and extends
to all within the range of the humanitarian doctrine of unseaworthiness.
The quid pro quo of the Longshoremen's Act will not be allowed to ne-
gate the established doctrine of unseaworthiness. The rationale may be
summarized as follows: (1) A shipowner is absolutely liable for the sea-
worthiness of his ship; (2) The liability of. a shipowner extends to long-
shoremen employed aboard the vessel; and (3) The Longshoremen's Act
will not be allowed to shelter a stevedore from breaches of his implied
warranty to shipowners, even when such breach is expressed in indemnity
for damages paid to longshoremen.
Although the dramatis personae is the same in cases where seaworthi-
ness and indemnity are involved, two distinct areas of law are involved.
The liability for unseaworthiness sounds in tort, and its humanitarian
quality reflects the contemporary social attitude toward industrial injuries.
On the other hand, the theory of implied indemnity gives rise to an
action in contract. The relationship between stevedore and shipowner
can be varied by the parties concerned. The liability of stevedore to ship-
owner is found in the contract between the parties. The liability of ship-
owner to longshoreman is found in a latter day "social contract."
CONCLUSION
The extension of the unseaworthiness doctrine reflects the growth
of concern for those who suffer industrial injuries. This development has
also taken place in many other areas of the law; but the course of ad-
miralty decisions may well provoke an even greater development in other
areas.
Although it has been charged that the Coures decisions in the
cases extending the unseaworthiness doctrine are judicial legislation, one
118. Id. at 415.
119. Ibid.
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